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FOREWORD
A Message From the Chair of the
IFB Research Foundation
This new report takes a first look at the corporate 
governance arrangements of the UK’s largest family 
firms. While family business is trusted more than 
business in general,1  better governance can help 
build on such trust. The analysis in this report shows 
that the boards of these firms are characterised by a 
high degree of independence. It also draws attention 
to some of the ways that family firms can raise their 
governance standards - by increasing gender diversity 
in their Boards and disclosing more information 
about their reporting practices.
The IFB Research Foundation is a charity which carries 
out independent research to better understand 
family businesses and their impact. In the coming 
year, we will follow-up this initial survey with more 
in-depth research on family governance in the UK’s 
largest family firms. The Wates Principles2  encourage 
large private firms to adopt corporate governance 
arrangements on an “apply and explain” basis. Going 
forwards, new research will be needed to assess the 
impact of these new regulations and guidance on 
large family firms. But it is clear that the quality of 
future research in this area depends on the availability 
of more and better data on large family firms.
I hope you find this report informative.
Sir Michael Bibby
Chairman, IFB Research Foundation
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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents an updated database of family 
firms ranked among the largest 1,000 companies 
registered in the United Kingdom (UK) (as measured 
by turnover) and it examines their corporate 
governance arrangements. 
The project has led to the development of a large 
database covering key information about large UK 
family firms’ ownership, corporate governance and 
important dimensions of strategy and performance.3 
Using these data, the report provides an overview of 
the population of large UK family firms and several 
analyses. 
The main findings from this research include the 
following:
Family Firm Representation Among the Top 1,000 
UK Companies 
The proportion of family firms among the top 1,000 
UK companies by turnover is 20.1% (N = 201 family 
firms), slightly lower than the 22.3% of UK companies 
reported in 2015 (Repgraph, 2016).4 
 
Among the 201 family firms in the list, 22 are classified 
as First-Generation Entrepreneurs (FGEs), compared 
to 20 in the 2016 report. 
Compared to 2015 (Repgraph, 2016), the following 
changes are observed in the population of large UK 
family firms:
• 127 family firms were already present in the 
2016 ranking.
• 74 new family firms entered the 2018 ranking, 
including seven FGEs and 29 family firms 
owned by UK families. 
• 82 family firms dropped out from the list of top 
1,000 UK companies, including 77 family firms 
and five FGEs.
The 201 family firms in the list include a mix of family 
firms owned by UK-national families and foreign-
national families. Specifically, these are delineated as 
follows:
• 111 family firms (55.2%) are owned by families 
with UK nationality, including 20 out of 22 FGEs.
• The remaining 90 family firms are owned by 
foreign-national families from 27 countries. 
Among these, 34 firms (16.9%) are owned by 
families from countries that belong to the 
European Union, and 23 firms are owned 
(11.4%) by US-national families.
Corporate Governance in Large UK Family Firms
Large UK family firms have, on average, larger boards 
of directors compared to all private family and non-
family firms in the UK.
In relation to board diversity, our results show: 
• There are low levels of gender diversity in the 
boards of directors of large UK family firms 
compared to FTSE 100 companies;
• Large UK family firms have relatively older 
board members compared to all private family 
and non-family firms registered in the UK. 
However, we also observe a higher level of age 
diversity compared to all private family and 
non-family firms in the UK.
• The average tenure of board members is under 
seven years. 
• The boards of directors of large UK family firms 
are comprised mainly of UK nationals.
2Large UK family firms have a relatively high level 
of board independence from family owners and 
shareholders:5
• The level of family involvement in the boards 
of directors of large UK family firms is low 
on average, suggesting a high level of board 
independence from the owning family.
• The average ratio of shareholders who are 
also members of the board of directors is low 
on average, suggesting a high level of board 
independence from shareholders overall.
• A few large UK family firms have a family 
member serving as the CEO, while CEO-duality 
(the dual role of the CEO as Chair of the Board 
of Directors) is also rare.
• Among the 35 family firms that report explicit 
data on board independence, the average level 
of board independence is higher compared to 
all private family and non-family firms in the 
UK.
There is very limited information about corporate 
governance codes available from secondary data 
sources. Nonetheless, the analysis of family firms’ 
reported compliance reveals some initial insights:
• 38 of the 201 largest family firms in the UK 
explicitly report the adoption of the UK 
Corporate Governance code.6 
• Among the remaining 163 family firms, 12 are 
subsidiaries of parent companies adopting the 
UK Corporate Governance code, and four family 
firms have at least one subsidiary adopting the 
UK Corporate Governance Code. 
• 41 family firms report the adoption of other 
governance codes, including other country/
region specific codes, stock exchange specific 
codes, 16 general other governance codes, and 
two UK other codes.
• Overall, the study highlights a limited level 
of transparency regarding the adoption of 
corporate governance codes among large UK 
family firms, as most companies do not disclose 
any information about their reporting practices. 
This is an area currently undergoing legislative 
change in the UK,7 with the issuance of 
standardised guidelines also being undertaken 
for large private firms. Therefore, further 
attention to this is needed in future research.
31. INTRODUCTION
Family firms are the most widespread form of 
business worldwide. They make up almost 90% of 
all the businesses in the private sector in the UK 
and make a major contribution to the UK economy.8 
Family businesses also make up 26% of all companies 
that went public on the London Stock Exchange from 
1995 through 2011,9  suggesting that family firms are 
prevalent among both private and listed companies.
Yet there is a lack of empirical evidence about large 
UK family firms and their corporate governance, 
despite the fact that corporate governance is widely 
recognised as a main driver of family firms’ strategic 
behaviour and performance.10  
This project starts to address this gap by assessing the 
corporate governance arrangements of large family 
firms in the UK. The main purpose of this project 
is to develop an updated database of large family 
firms in the UK and their corporate governance. 
Specifically, this report addresses the following
research questions:
1. What is the proportion of family firms among the 
largest 1,000 UK companies? 
2. How has the proportion of family firms changed 
over time?
3. How are large UK family firms’ boards of directors 
structured?
4. To what extent do large UK family firms report the 
adoption of standardised corporate governance 
codes?
The database of large UK family firms developed in 
this study includes additional information about 
strategy and performance, as outlined in the 
methodology section. This provides the basis for 
future research to examine the relationships between 
family firms’ corporate governance arrangements, 
important aspects of corporate strategy, innovation, 
and performance.  
4We build on the 2016 IFBRF UK Large Family Business 
Report (Repgraph, 2016), with the aim of updating the 
list of family firms ranked among the top 1,000 largest 
companies based in the UK11  by turnover to the latest 
year available, and we provide data about corporate 
governance arrangements, strategic behaviour and 
performance. Consistent with Repgraph (2016), in 
this study we focus on individual firms; hence we 
include all companies registered as legal entities 
in the UK, whether or not they are linked by cross-
shareholdings or pyramidal ownership structures 
(i.e., business groups). 
This section outlines the definition of family firms 
used in our study, the sources of data used to build 
the database, the main steps we took in our data 
collection and analysis, and the list of variables 
included in the database.
2.1  Definition of Family Firms 
Consistent with the definition of family firms adopted 
by the European Commission12 and Repgraph (2016), 
this study classifies family firms according to the 
following criteria:
• 50% family ownership (ultimate voting rights) in 
private firms 
• 25% family ownership (ultimate voting rights) in 
listed firms
Following prior research,13 we identified family 
members based on the condition that any shareholder, 
manager or director had the same family name of the 
company’s founder. Whilst this is a common proxy 
used in the literature, due to the difficulty to identify 
family ties among individuals who do not share the 
same family name, our results may underestimate 
the actual level of family involvement.
Moreover, consistent with Repgraph (2016), we 
differentiate First-Generation Entrepreneurs (FGEs) 
as a distinct sub-group of family firms, defined as those 
family firms that are owned and led by a founding 
entrepreneur with no discernible involvement of 
other family members.14 
2.2  Data Sources
For the purpose of our study, information about large 
UK family firms was collected from the following 
data sources:
• FAME and Thompson Eikon:
 ○ Information about firm ownership 
 ○ Accounting data and key ratios
• Companies House director database and 
BoardEx: 
 ○ Information on corporate governance 
• Company websites and reports: 
 ○ Additional data not available in existing 
databases, including firm policies (e.g., strategy, 
innovation, entrepreneurship, corporate social 
responsibility, etc.), adoption and compliance 
with governance codes, and firm performance.
2.3  Data Collection and Analysis
The data in this report relates to the latest data 
available in 2018.15 The data collection and analysis 
process were organised around the following steps: 
First, detailed data were collected at firm level to 
identify the top 1,000 UK companies by turnover. 
Second, data were collected at individual level for 
main shareholders and board members for each firm, 
then aggregated in order to have a summary at firm 
level. Third, in order to merge the data from different 
sources and at different levels, firm IDs and years 
were used in order to have/generate panel data. This 
enabled the merging of the data by firm ID and year, 
using statistical analysis software. Finally, descriptive 
and bivariate analyses were conducted, and the 
results of these analyses are reported here.
2. METHODOLOGY
52.4 Variables 
The data have been analysed according to three 
groups of variables: family ownership, corporate 
governance, strategy and performance.16  
Table 1 shows a breakdown of each group of variables, 
while specific definitions and measurement 
operationalisations are reported in Appendix I.17
Table 1. Overview of variables in the study
Categories Variables
Family Ownership % family ownership (including direct and indirect ownership)
Family owners’ nationality
First-Generation Entrepreneurs (FGEs)
Corporate Governance Board size
Board independence 
Board tenure
Family CEO
CEO duality 
Board diversity (gender, age, and nationality of board members)
Adoption of the UK Corporate Governance Codes 
Other adopted governance codes
Strategy and 
Performance18
Turnover
Listing Status Private/listed (including name of stock exchange market)
63.1 Large UK Family Firms
According to the latest data available in 2018, the 
proportion of family firms among the top 1,000 firms 
by turnover is 20.1% (201 companies), including 179 
family firms and 22 First-Generation Entrepreneurs 
(FGEs).19
The minimum and maximum turnover of family firms 
in the list are m£923 (ranked 996th) and m£22,200 
(ranked 32nd), respectively. The turnover of the UK 
company ranked 1,000th in the top 1,000 companies 
is m£919.20
The full list of all 201 large UK family firms, along 
with their ranking by turnover, changes compared 
to the 2015 data presented in Repgraph (2016), and 
key information for each company, is presented in 
Appendix II.21 
The list includes both private and listed companies, 
as shown in Figure 1. Among the 201 family firms 
identified in our study, 173 family firms (86.1%) are 
privately held, 28 family firms (13.9%) are listed on 
stock exchange markets, including 25 family firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange, and three 
family firms are listed on American stock exchanges 
(one on NASDAQ and two on NYSE). Overall, the 
proportion of family firms among listed companies 
(12.5%) is about one-half of the proportion of family 
firms among private companies (22.3%).
Figure 1. Summary of top 1,000 firms’ ownership and listing status
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7Table 2 reports the breakdown of large UK family 
firms included in the list of top 1,000 UK companies 
by turnover. This compares with the results reported 
in 2015 (Repgraph, 2016):
• 111 of the large UK family firms in our list (55.2%) 
are owned by families with UK nationality.
• 22 family firms are classified as FGEs, compared 
to 20 in Repgraph (2016). 
• 20 out of 22 FGEs are owned by families with UK 
nationality, compared to 20 in Repgraph (2016).22 
Finally, family firms owned by non-UK families have 
a higher turnover than those owned by UK families 
(m£3,364 versus m£2,228). 
Table 2. Profile of large UK family firms 2018
Number of firms Percentage
Nationality of family owners
UK-national 111 55.2%
Foreign-national 90 44.8%
Listing status
Listed 28 14.0%
Private 173 86.0%
Type of family owners
First-Generation 
Entrepreneurs (FGEs)
22 11.0%
Families 179 89.0%
Total 201 100%
3.2 Nationality of Family Owners 
A closer look at the nationality of family owners 
shows that 90 (44.8%) family firms are owned by 
foreign-national families. Among these, 34 firms 
(16.9%) are owned by families from countries that 
belong to the European Union, and 23 firms (11.4%) 
are owned by US families. Overall, Figure 2 and Table 
3 indicate a high level of international diversity within 
the population of large UK family firms.
8                                       Table 3. Nationality of family owners in large UK family firms
Country Number of firms Percentage
UK 111 55.2%
US 23 11.4%
India 8 3.9%
Germany 7 3.5%
Spain 6 3.0%
Hong Kong 5 2.5%
Iceland 5 2.5%
Austria 3 1.5%
Brazil 3 1.5%
Denmark 3 1.5%
France 3 1.5%
Turkey 3 1.5%
Canada 2 1.0%
Greece 2 1.0%
Russia 2 1.0%
South Africa 2 1.0%
Sweden 2 1.0%
Other* 11 5.5%
Total 201 100.0%
* Includes Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Chile, Lebanon, 
Switzerland, Mexico, China, Netherlands, Ireland and 
Italy; Each country is represented by one large UK 
family firm.
Figure 2. Nationality of family owners in large UK family firms 
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9We observed important changes in family firms’ 
rankings among the top 1,000 UK companies by 
turnover:
• The distribution of family firms in the ranking has 
changed slightly, with a lower number of family 
firms placed at the highest and lowest ends of the 
ranking: 
 ○ The number of family firms in the top 100 
ranking positions has decreased from 14 to 11.
 ○ The number of family firms at the lowest 
end of the ranking (positions 801-1,000) has 
decreased from 46 to 40.
• Among the 127 large UK family firms (including 
FGEs) that were also included in Repgraph (2016), 
98 decreased their rankings and 28 improved 
their ranking. 
• Among the six family firms that are not owned 
by UK families that improved their rankings, only 
one company is owned by an EU family. 
• Overall, changes in certain industries and 
mergers and acquisitions activity provide the 
main explanations of observed changes in family 
firms’ ranking among the top 1,000 UK companies 
by turnover. 
3.3 Population Changes 2015 – 
2018
Our study shows that, based on the latest turnover 
available in 2018, the total population of family firms 
among the top 1,000 UK companies (by turnover) is 
201 (20.1%), including:23 
• 127 family firms already present in Repgraph 
(2016), including 15 FGEs and 62 family firms 
(non-FGEs) owned by UK families.
• 74 new family firms that entered the list in the 
2018 ranking, including seven FGEs and 29 family 
firms owned by UK families. 35 new entrants are 
ranked among the top 500 UK companies, whilst 
only three new entrants are among the top 100 
UK companies. 
• 82 family firms dropped out from the 2016 
ranking, including 77 family firms (among which 
18 dropped out due to special circumstances) and 
five FGEs.
Changes in the turnover of large UK family firms 
between the 2015 data reported in Repgraph (2016) 
and the updated data from the current study are 
summarised in Table 4. Overall, the top 1,000 UK 
companies have increased their turnover since 
2015, but at the same time the minimum level of 
turnover for inclusion in the top 1,000 list increased 
from £626 million in the 2016 report to £919 million. 
We found that there has been a slight decrease in the 
proportion of family firms in the top 1,000 that are 
owned by UK families: a decrease from 130 (13.0%) in 
Repgraph (2016), to 111 (11.1%). 
10
Table 4. Summary of Top 1,000 UK firms by turnover 
2015 
(Repgraph, 2016)
2018
Panel A: All firms
Number of firms 1000 1000
Cumulative turnover (m£) 3,730,284 4,487,188
Mean turnover (m£) 3,730 4,487
Min turnover (m£) 626 919
Max turnover (m£) 277,485 230,639
Total number (%) of family firms, including FGEs 223 (22.3%) 201 (20.1%)
Total number (%) of firms owned by UK families, including FGEs 130 (13.0%) 111 (11.1%)
Panel B: Family firms excluding FGEs
Number of firms 203 179
Cumulative turnover (m£) 432,588 500,774
Mean turnover (m£) 2,131 2,797
Min turnover (m£) 628 923
Max turnover (m£) 23,325 22,220
Panel C: Family firms owned by UK families, excluding FGEs
Number of firms 110 91
Cumulative turnover (m£) 176,067 203,615
Mean turnover (m£) 1,761 2,237
Min turnover (m£) 628 923
Max turnover (m£) 13,417 15,526
Panel D: FGEs
Number of firms 20 22
Cumulative turnover (m£) 34,157 49,282
Mean turnover (m£) 1,708 2,240
Min turnover (m£) 643 1052
Max turnover (m£) 3,595 4,593
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4.1 Board Size
Board size refers to the number of members of the 
board of directors and is an important dimension 
of corporate governance in family firms. It is a 
proxy for board capital,24  including human capital 
(directors’ experience, expertise, knowledge, 
skills, and reputation) and social capital (resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived 
from the network of relationships possessed by 
board directors). Prior studies have shown the 
positive effects of board size on family firms’ financial 
performance,25  as well as on non-financial outcomes 
such as corporate social responsibility.26  
The results of our analysis are summarised in Figure 
3. The average board size among the largest UK family 
firms is 5.8 members,27  a larger figure compared to 
previous studies considering the whole population 
of private firms in the UK.28  Thus, our results suggest 
that family firms have, on average, larger boards of 
directors compared to smaller private family and 
non-family firms.
More specifically, our analysis shows that only four 
family firms have a single board member (i.e., sole 
directorship). Moreover, 14.4% of the large UK family 
firms have only two board members. Nonetheless, the 
median size of the board of directors is five, meaning 
that 98 out of the largest 201 family firms in the UK 
(48.8%) have six or more board members. These 
companies are near equally distributed between six 
and eleven board members, with only six companies 
having twelve or more. 
Finally, a comparison of family firms controlled by 
UK-national families vs. foreign-national families 
indicates that family firms controlled by UK-national 
families have a slightly higher average board size (6.0) 
compared to foreign national-owned family firms 
(5.5). 
Figure 3. Board size distribution in large UK family firms
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4.2 Board Diversity
The size of the board is a strong indicator of board 
capital, but the ability of the board of directors 
to provide access to valuable resources critically 
depends on the diversity of board members. Our 
analysis provides important insights on these issues 
by examining four dimensions of board diversity: 
• Gender diversity
• Age diversity
• Tenure diversity
• National diversity
First, gender is a key dimension of board diversity and 
is one that continues to attract much attention in 
the UK business world. Existing studies indicate that 
gender diversity has a positive effect on organizational 
outcomes,29  including, for example, boosting family 
firms’ entrepreneurial orientation30  or reducing their 
bankruptcy risk.31 
Clearly, our results show that large family firms in the 
UK have low levels of gender diversity in their boards 
of directors. Increasing gender diversity should be an 
important priority for large family firms in the UK, and 
the topic deserves further research attention as well.
In particular, our analysis (Figure 4) reveals that the 
average female representation on the board is as 
low as 12.5%, much lower compared to all FTSE 100 
companies (23.5%).32  Moreover, the majority of family 
firms (108) have no female directors at all. Among the 
remaining family firms, just 11 have boards that are 
more than 50% female.
Figure 4. Percentage of female directors in large UK family firms
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Another important dimension of board diversity 
relates to the age profile of the board of directors. 
The analysis in Figure 5 shows that the average age of 
board members in the largest 201 family firms in the 
UK is about 54 years. This is higher than that reported 
for all private family and non-family firms in the UK. 33
Only six family firms were found to have an average 
board members’ age below 45 years, whereas the 
average age is greater than 60 years in 31 family firms 
(15.4%).
Figure 6 shows the distribution of family firms by 
the average tenure of their board members. The rate 
of turnover among board members indicates the 
extent to which board membership changes over 
time, thereby bringing in new knowledge, skills and 
perspectives. The rate of board members’ turnover 
among all family firms is eighty months (6.7 years). 
Moreover, 116 family firms (57.7%) have a rate of 
turnover between three and seven years, and 48 
family firms (23.9%) between eight and fifteen years. 
Finally, in 15 family firms, the rate of turnover is 
greater than or equal to sixteen years. 
Figure 5. Average board members’ age in large UK family firms
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Overall, the analysis shows that the largest family 
firms vary in their choices concerning board members’ 
tenure: the majority change board members less than 
every seven years, but a proportion of them appears 
to keep the same directors for very long periods of 
time.
14
Finally, our analysis of board members’ nationalities 
(Figure 7) shows that 69 family firms (34.3%) have 
no foreign-national board members at all, and 87 
(43.3%) have less than 20% foreign nationals on their 
boards. Nonetheless, 17 family firms (8.5%) have an 
equal representation of UK and foreign nationals on 
the board of directors, and 58 family firms (28.9%) 
have a board of directors where foreign directors are 
in a majority. Among the latter, most (44 family firms) 
are represented by family firms owned by foreign-
national families.
Note: Directors with foreign nationality include directors with double nationality (UK & foreign nationality).
Figure 6. Average board members’ tenure in large UK family firms
Figure 7. Ratio of directors with foreign nationality
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4.3 Board Independence
Board independence is regarded as an important 
attribute of the board of directors,34  yet it is difficult 
to measure board independence using publicly 
available data, especially for non-listed firms. 
Moreover, the potential involvement in the ﬁrm of 
“outside” family members who may not be owners 
of the firm complicates the interpretation of board 
independence data.35
Notwithstanding these challenges, we explore the 
level of board independence in large family firms in 
the UK based on five conditions:36 
• Are members of the owning family directly 
involved in the board of directors?
• Do shareholders have a direct involvement in the 
board of directors?
• Is the CEO a family member?  
• Is the CEO also the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors (i.e., CEO duality)?
• Are the majority of board members independent 
from the main shareholders?37  
The analysis of family involvement in the board of 
directors (Figure 8 and Table 5) shows that the average 
level of family involvement in the board of directors is 
20.5%. A closer look at the distribution of family firms 
according to the level of family involvement in the 
board of directors shows that almost half of family 
firms (45.8%) have no family members on the board 
of directors. Just 34 family firms (16.9%) have family 
members representing the majority of the board of 
directors. Finally, family members on the board are 
more frequent in UK owned firms compared with 
family firms owned by foreign-nationality families.   
Table 5. Share of family members on the board in large UK family firms
% family members UK-national owned 
family firms
Foreign-national 
owned family firms 
All large UK family 
firms
0% 26.1 70.0 45.8
1-20% 25.2 12.2 19.4
21-40% 22.5 10.0 16.9
41-60% 10.8 1.1 6.5
61-80% 6.3 3.3 5.0
81-100% 9.0 2.2 6.0
n.a. 0.0 1.1 0.5
N 111 90 201
Figure 8. Share of family members on the board in large UK family firms
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On the other hand, the average proportion of board 
members who are also shareholders is 13.7%. As 
shown in Figure 9, most family firms (70.6%) have no 
shareholders as board members, and shareholders 
make up the majority of board members in only 27 
family firms (13.4%).
Overall, the level of family members’ and shareholders’ 
direct involvement in the boards of large family firms 
is relatively low compared to the whole population of 
family firms in the UK,38  suggesting a relatively high 
level of board independence in the largest family 
firms.39
Our analysis identifies two further indicators of board 
independence, namely the choice of the CEO40  and 
CEO duality (that is, whether the CEO is also Chair of 
the Board of Directors).41
A breakdown of family firms by CEO characteristics 
(Table 6) indicates that 47 family firms (23.3%) have 
a family member as CEO, whereas 134 family firms 
(66.8%) are led by a non-family CEO. This information 
was unavailable in the other 20 cases. The data also 
indicate that only 17 family firms have a dual CEO-
Board chair (8.4%). In nine of these cases, the CEO-
Board chair is a family member. In 52.7% of cases (106 
family firms), the CEO is neither the chairman nor a 
family member. 
Table 6. CEOs in large UK family firms
CEO duality All
Family CEO Yes No Missing data
Yes 9 (4.5%) 28 (13.9%) 10 47 (23.3%)
No 8 (3.9%) 106 (52.7%) 20 134 (66.8%)
Missing data 0 2 (1.0%) 18 20 (9.9%)
Total 17 (8.4%) 136 (67.6%) 48 201 (100.0%)
Note: CEO family member status is not available for 20 companies. CEO duality is 
not available for 48 companies. Percentages have been calculated based on the full 
sample of 201 family firms.
Figure 9. Share of board members who are also shareholders in large UK family firms
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Overall, these findings suggest that family leadership 
is relatively rare in large family firms in the UK, as 
these firms appear to be most commonly led by non-
family leaders.42 
Finally, we find that only 35 out of 201 family firms 
disclose information on board independence. By 
analysing the information on board independence 
among the 35 family firms that report these data,43 
we find that the average level of board independence 
among these firms is 42.7%, which is higher than 
private family and non-family firms in the UK,44  but 
similar to the level observed in listed family firms 
in the US.45 Clearly, the lack of data in this area is a 
critical issue that calls for more consistent guidance 
for reporting board independence.
Note: Information available only for 35 out of 201 family firms in the UK.
4.4  Adoption of Corporate 
Governance Codes
National and international corporate governance 
codes are self-regulatory codes, usually based on the 
“comply or explain” principle. They are commonly 
issued for listed companies, although there are also 
codes designed for non-listed companies,46  or even 
for both listed and non-listed companies. More 
recently, there has also been the issuance of codes 
designed for companies with a specific ownership 
structure, for different types of financial institutions, 
or for voluntary and charitable organizations. Since 
the issuance of the Cadbury code in 1992, the UK has 
led the development and diffusion of these codes
Figure 10. Proportion of independent directors on the board in 
large UK family firms
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around the world, with the exception of codes aimed 
to improve the governance of private companies or 
family firms. In addition, corporate governance codes 
can be designed at individual firm level.47
Regarding the issuance of codes aimed to improve 
the governance of private companies or family 
firms in the UK, this is an area currently undergoing 
legislative change in the UK, with the issuance of 
standardised guidelines also for large private firms48 
- such as the “Wates Corporate Governance Principles 
for Large Private Companies” issued in December 
2018 (FRC, 2018).49  Companies that are not required 
to adhere to particular governance codes, such as 
large private companies before December 2018, can 
do so and report such information on a voluntary 
basis.50 Previous studies show that several factors 
can influence the rate of compliance with codes’ 
recommendations,51  including firm’s size and family 
ownership structure.52 
The breakdown of large UK family firms by adoption 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code (i.e., the UK 
Code) and other governance codes is shown in Figure 
11. In particular, 38 of the 201 largest family firms in 
the UK explicitly report the adoption of the UK Code, 
whereas the remaining 163 family firms (81.1%) do 
not disclose any information about their reporting 
practices. Because not all firms are required to report 
adoption of the UK Code, this could mean either that 
the majority of family firms have not adopted the UK 
Code, or that they have adopted the UK Code but have 
not reported this explicitly in their corporate reports 
and websites.
A closer look at the corporate websites of those 
163 family firms that do not report the adoption of 
the UK Corporate Governance code shows a more 
nuanced picture. Specifically, we found a wide variety 
of practices, including 12 family firms (5.9%) that are 
subsidiaries of parent companies adopting the UK 
Corporate Governance code, and four family firms 
(1.9%) that have at least one subsidiary adopting the 
UK Corporate Governance code. In two family firms, 
no information about governance code adoption 
could be found at all.
Figure 11. Adoption of the UK Corporate Governance code in large UK family firms (number of firms)
38
147
4 12
Adopts UK corporte governance code
Not reported
Not reported (Subsidiary Company
adopts UK corporte governance code)
Not reported (Parent Company adopts
UK corporte governance code)
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Other Reported Governance Codes
Country (Region) 
Specific
Hong Kong’s Guide on Environment, Society and Governance
German Corporate Governance Code
Swedish Corporate Governance code
AFEP-MEDEF Code (France)
Dutch Corporate Governance Code
Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance
Stock Exchange 
Specific
Admission and Disclosure Standards of the Main Market of the London Stock 
Exchange and the UK Listing Rules
Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
Limited
Swiss Stock Exchange Directives
NASDAQ Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Rules 
NYSE Corporate Governance Rules and NYSE Criteria for Directors’ Independence
Others Country specific UK Financial Conduct Authority DTR (Disclosure 
and Transparency Rules) and MAR (Market Abuse 
Regulation)
UK Stewardship Code
General (Internal) Corporate Governance Code/Guidelines/
Principles
Charter of the Audit Committee
Charter of the Compensation Committee
Charter of the Finance Committee
Charter of the Nominating and Governance 
Committee
Charter of the Sustainability and Innovation 
Committee
Code of Business Ethics
Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Personnel
Code of Ethics for the Board of Directors
Code of Conduct
Global Code of Conduct
Anti-Money Laundering
Anti-Bribery
Anti-Slavery
Tax Strategy Statement
Modern Slavery Act
Table 7.  Adoption of other governance codes
Moreover, 41 companies report the adoption of other 
governance codes, including six other country/region 
specific codes (Hong Kong, German, Swedish, French, 
Dutch, and Swiss), five stock exchange specific codes 
(UK, Hong Kong, Swiss, NASDAQ, and NYSE), 16 
general other governance codes, and two UK other 
codes (Financial Conduct Authority DTR and MAR). 
This information is summarized in Table 7.
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This report has examined the corporate governance 
arrangements of large family firms registered in the 
UK. As part of the project, an up-to-date database 
of large UK family firms among the largest 1,000 UK 
companies (as measured by turnover) was created. 
This includes key information about firm ownership, 
corporate governance arrangements, and further 
data concerning strategy and performance.
The report has provided an overview of the population 
of large UK family firms and evidence concerning 
two broad areas of inquiry, namely family firms’ 
representation among the top 1,000 UK companies 
(by turnover), and the corporate governance 
arrangements of the largest UK family firms.
The investigation has a number of limitations that 
point to opportunities for future research.
First, board independence from family owners and 
shareholders was examined according to several 
relevant dimensions. However, most family firms do 
not state the independence of their directors explicitly 
in public records or websites. If the lack of reporting 
continues in the future, we suggest collecting 
further data about board independence, not only 
through secondary research. In particular, given the 
complexity of addressing board independence beyond 
directly observable board members’ characteristics 
(e.g., family members, shareholders, etc.), collecting 
further data about board independence through 
primary research offers a promising focus for future 
research.
Second, around six out of ten UK large family firms 
do not report the adoption of any governance codes. 
This suggests that the lack of standards and guidance 
from the UK legislative body in this regard might be a 
major issue. For companies, the lack of standardised 
guidelines creates difficulties in reporting information 
about compliance with governance codes. For 
researchers, this means that there is a lack of useful 
information that might help understanding of family 
firms’ compliance and reporting behaviour. In fact, 
the current lack of standards and guidelines makes 
it virtually impossible to distinguish between lack of 
compliance versus lack of reporting.
Our results confirm that, without standards and 
guidance from the UK legislative body in this 
regard, obtaining accurate data on compliance with 
corporate governance codes may only be possible 
through further primary research, that is through 
the use of surveys. The lack of reporting is something 
which should change after the introduction of a 
statutory requirement for large companies to report 
on their corporate governance arrangements (The 
Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 
2018). This is accompanied by the publication of 
standardised guidelines for large private firms – the 
recently launched Wates Corporate Governance 
Principles for Large Private Companies in December 
2018 (FRC, 2018). This offers a promising focus for 
future research that could study the determinants 
and the extensiveness of the adoption of governance 
codes and frameworks, and their effects on firms’ 
governance practices and disclosure (including the 
reasons for non-compliance and independence of 
the Board members) to contribute to the extensive 
literature on this topic (for a recent review see Cuomo, 
Mallin and Zattoni, 2016).
5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
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Third, our results show a considerable amount of 
change in family firms’ rankings among the top 1,000 
UK companies (by turnover). The systematic study of 
the causes driving these changes offers a promising 
focus for future research.
Fourth, this study has some limitations. In line with 
the approach taken in Repgraph (2016), this study 
takes a firm-level unit of analysis, thereby providing 
separate information about individual companies
even when those companies are related by cross-
shareholding structures (i.e., business groups). Due 
to the initial research design we adopted, analysis 
at the business group level was not possible, as 
those business groups often extend well beyond 
the top 1,000 companies by turnover considered in 
this study. However, the database created as part 
of this project provides detailed information about 
such relationships, which makes it possible to track 
the links between individual companies and their 
common ultimate owner, and whether each company 
is a subsidiary, parent, or parent and ultimate owner. 
In addition, in line with the approach taken in 
Repgraph (2016), this study used consolidated or 
unconsolidated data. Future studies could further 
investigate governance issues by using a different 
research design, with the aim to shift the attention 
from firm-level to business group level. For example, 
exploring potential differences in corporate 
governance arrangements and practices between 
parent companies and subsidiaries within a family 
business group is a promising avenue for future 
research.
Finally, we believe that it is important to extend the 
analysis reported here to the top 2,000 companies 
and recommend updating the database of large 
UK family firms among the largest UK companies 
annually.
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ENDNOTES 
1   Edelman Trust Barometer: Special Report on Family Business. 2017. https://www.edelman.com/research/
family-business-trust
2   FRC (2018) The Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies. Available at: www.frc.
org.uk/getattachment/31dfb844-6d4b-4093-9bfe-19cee2c29cda/Wates-Corporate-Governance-Principles-
for-LPC-Dec-2018.pdf
3  See the full list of variables in the Methodology section.
4  Institute for Family Business (IFB) 2016 UK Large Family Business Report (https://www.ifb.org.uk/
media/1963/uk-large-family-business-report-2016-website-final.pdf)
5  See the methods section for further details concerning the identification of family ties.
6  The UK Corporate Governance Code is published by the Financial Reporting Council. The latest version 
of the Code is available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-
corporate-governance-code. For recent developments, see also: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-
accounts/private-firms-in-britain-to-comply-with-first-governance-code-idUKKBN1O900C
7  See https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8143#fullreport
8   Oxford Economics (2018).
9  Kotlar, Signori, De Massis, and Vismara (2018).
10  See, for example, Carney (2005), and Zattoni, Gnan, and Huse (2015).
11   Please note that we define “UK companies” as all companies registered and based in the UK, regardless of 
the nationality of their ultimate owner.
12  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/we-work-for/family-business_en 
13  For example, see Cannella Jones, and Withers (2015) and Kotlar, Signori, De Massis, and Vismara (2018). 
14  Cannella, Jones, and Withers (2015).
15  First, ownership data were retrieved from the online version of the FAME database on 20 June 2018. 
Turnover and other financial data are based on the latest available data in 2017 or 2016. Companies with no 
turnover data available in 2017 or 2016 were excluded from the study. Then, ownership and governance data 
on 20 June 2018 not available in FAME were collected between 15th July 2018 and 15th August 2018 from 
several other sources (see the Methodology section for more details about these sources).
16  For the purpose of the present study, we consider only companies with turnover data available for the 
year 2017 or 2016. In order to develop the ranking of large UK family firms, we used the latest data available, 
whereas family firms with no turnover reported in 2016 or 2017 were excluded from the list. Further 
information about companies excluded from the 2018 ranking is available from the authors upon request.
17  Available from IFB Research Foundation upon request.
18  Data were also collected for these other key variables: asset turnover, industry, number of companies in 
corporate, firm age and number of employees, financial ratios (ROA, ROI, RO shareholder funds, Tobin’s Q, 
profit margin, EBIT), interest cover, stock turnover, ratio between cost of goods sold and average inventory, 
debtors’ turnover and collection, creditors’ collection, liquidity ratios and R&D expenses.
19  This study focuses on individual firms; hence, the list includes companies as separate entities even if they 
are linked by cross-shareholdings or pyramidal ownership structures (i.e., business groups). 
20  Three companies were not included in the study because they did not disclose turnover data in 2017 or 
2016, as they disclosed their accounting data after the data collection in July 2018. By including them, the 
turnover threshold defining the top 1,000 UK firms would be £921m.
21   Available from IFBRF upon request.
22  Among the 22 FGEs identified in our list, four belong to the same business group.
23   A detailed summary of these changes is available from the authors upon request.
24   Hillman and Dalziel (2003).
25  For example, see Gersick and Feliu (2014).
26  Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Rodríguez-Ariza, and García-Sánchez (2015).
27  Information about board size was not available for one company, which was excluded from this analysis.
  
23
28  Wilson, Wright, and Scholes (2013).
29  For a review on gender issues in family firm governance, see Martinez Jimenez (2009) and Campopiano, De 
Massis, Rinaldi, and Sciascia (2017).
30  Arzubiaga, Iturralde, Maseda, and Kotlar (2018).
31  Wilson, Wright, and Scholes (2013).
32  Vinnicombe, Doldor, Sealy, Pryce, and Turner (2018).
33  Wilson, Wright, and Scholes (2013).
34  Zattoni and Cuomo (2010).
35  Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2004).
36  Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2004).
37  This information was available only for 35 family firms, including all the 28 family firms that are currently 
listed on stock markets, two family firms that were previously listed but are not anymore, and five private 
family firms.
38  Wilson, Wright, and Scholes (2013).
39  As indicated in the methods section, our data may underestimate the level of family involvement due to 
the identification of family ties based on individuals sharing the same family name. However, the comparison 
with Wilson, Wright, and Scholes (2013) is appropriate as the two studies adopt the same definition and 
operationalization approach. 
40  See Krause, Semadeni, and Cannella Jr (2014).
41  See Voordeckers, Van Gils, and Van den Heuvel (2007).
42  Bammens, Voordeckers, and Van Gils (2011).
43  Due to the limited number of observations, this information should be interpreted with caution. 
44  Wilson, Wright, and Scholes (2013).
45  Anderson and Reeb (2004).
46  Such as the Code Buysse (2009).
47  For updated national and international codes, guidance, and legislation that takes into account the latest 
legal and policy changes, see Mallin (2018).
48  A summary of the UK’s recent Corporate Governance Reforms can be found here: https://
researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8143#fullreport/
49 The Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies is a new corporate governance 
code for all companies that do not have an existing corporate governance reporting requirement and satisfy 
either or both of the following conditions: (1) they have more than 2000 employees; (2) they have a turnover 
of more than £200 million and a balance sheet of more than £2 billion. This new reporting requirement will 
apply to the financial years beginning 1 January 2019 with reporting to start in 2020. Available at: https://
www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/31dfb844-6d4b-4093-9bfe-19cee2c29cda/Wates-Corporate-Governance-
Principles-for-LPC-Dec-2018.pdf. See also https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/
Summary/CBP-8143#fullreport
50  Except publicly listed companies that must adopt specific governance codes, if required by the stock 
exchange market.
51  For a recent review of these studies, see Cuomo, Zattoni and Mallin (2016).
52  On the one hand, several studies find that family-owned firms are less likely to comply with voluntary 
recommendations than non-family firms (e.g., see Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, 2010 for the UK; Zeidan, 
2014 for Brazil). On the other hand, the results of a recent study by Kabbach de Castro, Aguilera, and Crespí-
Cladera (2017) show an inverted U-shaped effect of family ownership on non-compliance of the largest firms 
by market capitalization listed in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain. In particular, this study finds 
that while the family influence and control dimensions lead to high levels of non-compliance, image and 
reputation dimensions lessen the level of non-compliance.
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